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I. INTRODUCTION 
Open government laws allow private citizens to monitor public 
servants. But this vital function of access presents a clash of competing 
interests: the privacy of public employees versus the public’s right to 
know.1 Washington’s Public Records Act (PRA) seeks to balance these 
interests, and the Washington Supreme Court has fought to adhere to the 
PRA’s spirit of open government while creating bright-line rules for the 
ease of government agencies.2 The Washington Supreme Court’s efforts 
recently led to a puzzling compromise in Bainbridge Island Police Guild 
v. City of Puyallup.3 To protect the privacy of a police officer accused of 
unsubstantiated sexual misconduct, the court ordered the production of 
police investigative reports under the PRA, but required that the trial 
court “redact Officer Cain’s identity.”4 The irony, of course, is that men-
tioning a person’s name while ordering the redaction of his identity does 
little to protect his privacy. 
The PRA provides for the disclosure of all records maintained by 
public agencies with the exception of certain narrowly construed exemp-
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 1. See, e.g., W. Alan Kailer, Note, The Release of Private Information Under Open Records 
Laws, 55 TEX. L. REV. 911 (1977); Martin E. Halstuk, Shielding Private Lives from Prying Eyes: 
The Escalating Conflict Between Constitutional Privacy and the Accountability Principle of Democ-
racy, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 71 (2003). 
 2. See, e.g., Bellevue John Does 1–11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 189 P.3d 139 (Wash. 
2008); see also Jeffery A. Ware, Note, Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter: How Did 
Private Businesses Become Government “Agencies” Under the Washington Public Records Act?, 33 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 741, 745–46 (2010) (“For a generation, Washington citizens have been accus-
tomed to the right of free and open access to state and local government records.”). 
 3. Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 259 P.3d 190, 202 (Wash. 2011). 
 4. Id. 
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tions.5 In Bainbridge Island Police Guild, the court considered the per-
sonal privacy and law enforcement exemptions.6 Both exemptions pro-
tect against an invasion of privacy, which the PRA defines as the disclo-
sure of information that would be (1) highly offensive to a reasonable 
person and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public.7 The Bainbridge 
Island Police Guild court held that investigative reports of unsubstantiat-
ed allegations of sexual misconduct against public officials are highly 
offensive to a reasonable person and that the public has an interest in 
knowing about the fact of an allegation, but not the identity of the ac-
cused.8 This holding built on the framework of several cases, primarily 
Bellevue John Does, which applied the same rule to schoolteachers.9 
However, in Bainbridge Island Police Guild, the officer’s name had been 
published in news stories10 and was listed in the case caption,11 resulting 
in the confounding order that the trial court “redact Officer Cain’s identi-
ty” from the investigative reports.12 Through its prior holdings, the court 
backed itself into a corner and created disagreement among the justices.13 
The opinions authored by Justice Fairhurst and Chief Justice Madsen14 in 
Bellevue John Does and Bainbridge Island Police Guild illustrate the 
                                                            
 5. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2012) states as follows: 
The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies that serve them. The 
people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what 
is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist 
on remaining informed so that they may maintain control over the instruments that they 
have created. This chapter shall be liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly con-
strued to promote this public policy and to assure that the public interest will be fully pro-
tected. In the event of conflict between the provisions of this chapter and any other act, 
the provisions of this chapter shall govern. 
 6. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 195. The personal privacy exemption is WASH. 
REV. CODE § 42.56.230(3) (2012). As of January 1, 2012, the legislature modified this exemption 
but this specific provision was unchanged. The law enforcement exemption is WASH. REV. CODE § 
42.56.240(1) (2012). 
 7. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.050 (2012). 
 8. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 198–202. 
 9. Bellevue John Does 1–11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 189 P.3d 139, 153 (Wash. 2008); 
see also Koenig v. City of Des Moines, 142 P.3d 162 (Wash. 2006); Cowles Publ’g Co. v. State 
Patrol, 748 P.2d 597 (Wash. 1988). 
 10. Josh Farly, Puyallup Report Finds No Crime by Bainbridge Officer During 2007 Traffic 
Stop, KITSAP SUN (May 10, 2008), http://www.kitsapsun.com/news/2008/may/10/puyallup-report-
finds-no-crime-by-bainbridge-in/; see also Amicus Curiae Brief of Allied Daily Newspapers of 
Washington et. al. at 9, Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 259 P.3d 190 (Wash. 
2011) (No. 82374–0 & No. 82803–2) (discussing and listing the various news stories that connect 
Officer Cain to the allegations and are still viewable online). 
 11. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d 190. The case caption actually mentions Steven 
Cain by name twice because the case was a consolidation of two appeals. 
 12. Id. at 202. 
 13. See Koenig, 142 P.3d at 168; Cowles Publ’g, 748 P.2d. at 609. 
 14. Through much of this Note, Chief Justice Madsen is referred to as Justice Madsen to con-
vey the position she held at the time of the cited opinion. 
2013] Public Duties, Private Rights 1555 
primary issue dividing the court: whether any privacy interest is triggered 
when an allegation against a public official is deemed unsubstantiated by 
the public agency.15 Consequently, the court’s inability to agree and the 
Bainbridge Island Police Guild lead opinion’s rule will likely result in 
confusion and litigation over the lines between embarrassment and pri-
vacy and between unsubstantiated and substantiated allegations. To the 
parties, the effect of redacting Officer Cain’s identity was minimal; but 
the effect of expanding the right to privacy beyond personal and intimate 
details contradicts the legislature, sets an overly broad precedent, and 
entrusts public agencies with excessive discretion. 
Part II of this Note lays out the events that led to Kim Koenig’s al-
legations of misconduct against Bainbridge Island Police Officer Steven 
Cain and the subsequent public records requests. Part III presents the 
policies of the PRA and the reasoning employed in the opinions in Bain-
bridge Island Police Guild and prior cases. Part IV critiques the court’s 
reasoning in its right to privacy jurisprudence. Part V offers a brief con-
clusion. 
II. THE ARREST, ALLEGATIONS, AND SUBSEQUENT PUBLIC RECORDS 
REQUESTS 
Kim Koenig and her husband John Muenster practice law together 
on Bainbridge Island, largely in the areas of civil rights and police 
abuse.16 After midnight on September 30, 2007, a Bainbridge Island Po-
lice Officer pulled Muenster over for allegedly driving 45 miles per hour 
(MPH) in a 30 MPH zone.17 The officer suspected Muenster had been 
drinking and asked him to exit the car; Koenig exited on the passenger 
side, claiming that she was Muenster’s attorney.18 The officer called for 
backup, and Officer Cain arrived.19 
The parties dispute the events that followed. Koenig claims Officer 
Cain “dry humped” her; Officer Cain claims he hip checked her.20 
Koenig claims she had only had one drink; Officer Cain and other offic-
ers claim she smelled of alcohol and slurred her speech.21 Koenig claims 
                                                            
 15. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 296 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting); Bellevue John 
Does, 189 P.3d at 157 (Madsen, J., dissenting). Justice Fairhurst wrote the majority in Bellevue John 
Does, while then-Justice Madsen authored a dissent. After Justice Madsen’s promotion to Chief 
Justice, she authored another dissent in Bainbridge Island Police Guild, while Justice Fairhurst 
wrote the lead opinion. 
 16. THE LAW OFFICES OF MUENSTER & KOENIG, http://muensterkoenig.com/ (last visited Oct. 
14, 2011). 
 17. Farly, supra note 10. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
1556 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1553 
Officer Cain choked her until she defecated out of fear; Officer Cain 
claims he merely restrained her because she was resisting arrest.22 
Koenig subsequently filed a complaint with the Bainbridge Island 
Police Department against Officer Cain, alleging sexual assault and 
strangulation.23 The Bainbridge Island Police Chief had the option to 
keep the matter in house, but chose to ask the Puyallup Police Depart-
ment to conduct a criminal investigation and the Mercer Island Police 
Department to conduct an internal investigation into Officer Cain’s con-
duct.24 Both investigations determined that there was insufficient evi-
dence to establish that Officer Cain acted inappropriately, and the Bain-
bridge Island Police Department declared the allegations unsubstantiat-
ed.25 
The incident began to draw media attention after Koenig notified 
the Bainbridge Island Police Department that she intended to sue the de-
partment for $400,000 in February 2008.26 Althea Paulson of the Bain-
bridge Notebook blog covered the incident closely and initially chose not 
to reveal Officer Cain’s identity.27 But within days, the Kitsap Sun news-
paper picked up the story and included Officer Cain’s name.28 
What followed was a maze of records requests and lawsuits in a se-
ries of agencies and jurisdictions. To research Koenig’s claims, Paulson 
and Tristan Baurick of the Kitsap Sun requested copies of both the Mer-
cer Island Internal Investigation Report (MIIIR) and the Puyallup Crimi-
nal Investigation Report (PCIR) from the Bainbridge Island Police De-
partment.29 Bainbridge Island allowed Paulson to view but not copy the 
PCIR30 and told Paulson that the MIIIR would be produced absent an 
                                                            
 22. Id. 
 23. Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 259 P.3d 190, 192 (Wash. 2011). 
 24. Brief of Respondents Bainbridge Island Police Guild & Steven Cain at 3, Bainbridge Island 
Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 259 P.3d 190 (Wash. 2011) (No. 82374–0 & No. 82803–2). 
 25. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 193. 
 26. Althea Paulson, City Hit With Police Misconduct Claim, BAINBRIDGE NOTEBOOK (Feb. 4, 
2008), http://bainbridgenotes.wordpress.com/2008/02/04/city-hit-with-police-misconduct-claim/. 
 27. Althea Paulson, Mob Feeds on Lawyer, Local MSM Averts Its Gaze, BAINBRIDGE 
NOTEBOOK (Feb. 11, 2008), http://bainbridgenotes.wordpress.com/2008/02/11/mob-feeds-on-
lawyer-local-msm-averts-its-gaze/. 
 28. Tristan Baurick, Bainbridge Lawyer Files Claim Against Police Department, KITSAP SUN 
(Feb. 9, 2008), http://www.kitsapsun.com/news/2008/feb/09/bainbridge-lawyer-files-claim-against-
police/?print=1. Paulson, of the Bainbridge Notebook, criticized the Kitsap Sun for giving a police-
friendly version of the story and allowing online attacks against Koenig in its comment section. See 
Paulson, supra note 27. 
 29. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 193. 
 30. Id. at 201. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.080 (2012) prohibits the retention and copying of 
nonconviction data, which is defined as “all criminal history record information relating to an inci-
dent which has not led to a conviction or other disposition adverse to the subject, and for which 
proceedings are no longer actively pending.” WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.030(2) (2012). While not 
part of the PRA, this statute falls under the “other statutes” exemption of the PRA. See WASH. REV. 
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injunction.31 Baurick requested a copy of the PCIR directly from the City 
of Puyallup.32 Puyallup notified Officer Cain of the request,33 and since 
he did not object, Puyallup gave Baurick the 117-page report.34 
The Bainbridge Island Police Guild (BIPG) and Officer Cain then 
sued in Kitsap County Superior Court to prevent Bainbridge Island from 
releasing the reports.35 The court found that the release of either report 
would violate Officer Cain’s right to privacy and withheld them under 
the PRA’s investigative report exemption.36 However, the court did not 
enjoin the Kitsap Sun from printing an article with information from the 
PCIR that it had received from Puyallup because the City of Puyallup 
was not a party to the case.37 In addition to the Kitsap Sun, other news-
papers and internet sources printed articles detailing the events and iden-
tifying Officer Cain.38 In June and July of 2008, Koenig and Bainbridge 
Island resident Lawrence Koss filed requests for the PCIR from 
Puyallup.39 Officer Cain moved to enjoin Puyallup from producing the 
report in Pierce County Superior Court.40 The court initially granted ac-
cess to the report, but later found the report exempt under the PRA’s per-
sonal privacy exemption and required Koenig and Koss to return the re-
port.41 The parties appealed directly to the Washington Supreme Court.42 
                                                                                                                                     
CODE § 42.56.070(1) (2012). The Washington Supreme Court also addressed this basis for exempt-
ing production of the reports but concluded that WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.030 only protects rec-
ords arising from an arrest, detention, indictment, or other criminal charge. Bainbridge Island Police 
Guild, 259 P.3d at 201–02. Since none of these occurred, Officer Cain’s identity as the alleged of-
fender was deemed to be the only “criminal history record information” in the reports. Id. After 
reviewing the investigative files, Paulson described “a remarkable lack of observational and 
memory skills by the police during the traffic stop that led to Koenig’s arrest. Worse, after Koenig 
formally complained that she was assaulted by Officer Steve Cain, the BIPD destroyed written doc-
uments detailing at least one prior, relevant complaint against him.” Althea Paulson, BI Blue Line: 
Protect and Serve or Shred and Forget?, BAINBRIDGE NOTEBOOK (Mar. 11, 2008), 
http://bainbridgenotes.wordpress.com/2008/03/11/bi-blue-line-protect-and-serve-or-shred-and-
forget/. 
 31. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 193. 
 32. Id. 
 33. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.540 (2012) provides, “An agency has the option of notifying 
persons named in the record or to whom a record specifically pertains, that release of a record has 
been requested.” After receiving notification, the person to whom the record pertains may move for 
an injunction in the superior court. Id. 
 34. See Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 193. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. The investigative report exemption contains a privacy provision similar to the personal 
privacy exemption. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.240(1) (2012). 
 37. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 193. 
 38. Id.; see also Farly, supra note 10. 
 39. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 193. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. The Washington Supreme Court hears direct appeals of cases “involving a fundamental 
and urgent issue of broad public import which requires prompt and ultimate determination . . . .” 
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Koenig, Koss, Baurick, and Paulson sent similar requests to Mercer Is-
land for the MIIIR.43 Officer Cain and the BIPG successfully moved for 
King County Superior Court to enjoin production.44 The record reques-
tors appealed, and the Washington Supreme Court consolidated the case 
with the Piece County appeal because both appeals involved the same 
records held by different agencies.45 
III. THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT’S ATTEMPTS TO IDENTIFY AND 
PROTECT PRIVACY RIGHTS 
A. Washington’s Public Records Act 
Every state has an open records law,46 often referred to as “sunshine 
laws.”47 Most states have modeled their laws after the federal Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA)48 and are rooted in the idea that the government 
must be monitored by the people it serves.49 Washington’s PRA is a 
“strongly worded mandate for broad disclosure of public records.”50 The 
PRA creates a presumption that any record maintained or used by a gov-
ernment agency is open to the public.51 Parties may overcome this pre-
sumption only if an exemption applies to the requested record.52 Courts 
must interpret the exemptions narrowly.53 Unless an agency is confident 
that an exemption applies, it may be reluctant to withhold a record be-
cause the PRA allows record requestors who prevail over an agency in 
                                                                                                                                     
WASH. R. APP. P. 4.2(a)(4); see also Statement of Grounds for Direct Review at 10, Bainbridge 
Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 259 P.3d 190 (Wash. 2011) (No. 82374–0 & No. 82803–2). 
 43. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 193. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 
86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1161 (2002). 
 47. The term “sunshine laws” originates from Justice Louis Brandeis’s proclamation that “sun-
light is said to be the best of disinfectants.” See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND 
HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914). Laws demanding information from public officials exist in 
other forms as well. See Joshua M. Duffy, King Makers?: Talk Radio, the Media Exemption, and Its 
Impact on the Washington Political Landscape, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 191, 193 (2009) (discussing 
early Washington laws targeted at public disclosure of political campaign finance funds). 
 48. Solove, supra note 46, at 1161. 
 49. James Madison famously explained this view: “A popular Government, without popular 
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. 
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must 
arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.” Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry 
(Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); see also 
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2012). 
 50. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 580 P.2d 246, 249 (Wash. 1978). 
 51. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070 (2012). 
 52. Id. 
 53. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2012). 
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court to recover costs, attorney’s fees, and per diem penalties.54 Thus, the 
Bainbridge Island, Mercer Island, and Puyallup Police Departments 
wisely exercised their right under the PRA to notify Officer Cain that 
they planned to produce the reports.55 While initially failing to object to 
Puyallup’s production of the PCIR, Officer Cain eventually moved to 
enjoin further production of both reports.56 As a result, the record reques-
tors could only prevail in litigation over Officer Cain, preventing them 
from recovering costs, attorney’s fees, or penalties by prevailing over an 
agency.57 
The court in Bainbridge Island Police Guild applied two exemp-
tions to the reports sought by Koenig and the other requesters: the per-
sonal information exemption and the law enforcement exemption.58 The 
personal information exemption, in relevant part, exempts “[p]ersonal 
information in files maintained for employees, appointees, or elected of-
ficials of any public agency to the extent that disclosure would violate 
their right to privacy.”59 Similarly, the law enforcement exemption pro-
tects “[s]pecific intelligence information and specific investigative rec-
ords compiled by investigative, law enforcement, and penology agencies, 
and state agencies vested with the responsibility to discipline members of 
any profession, the nondisclosure of which is essential to effective law 
enforcement or for the protection of any person’s right to privacy.”60 The 
applicability of either exemption hinged on whether disclosure of the 
investigative reports would violate Officer Cain’s right to privacy.61 
Under the PRA, a person’s right to privacy is violated if disclosure 
“(1) [w]ould be highly offensive to a reasonable person and (2) is not of 
legitimate concern to the public.”62 However, more significant than when 
a right to privacy is violated is when a right to privacy exists at all. The 
                                                            
 54. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.550(4) (2012); Yousoufian v. Office of Ron Sims, King 
Cnty. Exec., 229 P.3d 735, 747 (Wash. 2010) (adopting aggravating and mitigating factors such as 
whether the agency acted dishonestly for determining the appropriate penalties). 
 55. Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 259 P.3d 190, 193 (Wash. 2011); see 
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.540. 
 56. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 193. 
 57. Id. at 208 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (Justice Johnson notes that neither the lead nor dissent-
ing and concurring opinions addressed attorney’s fees but that attorney’s fees were not awardable 
because the requestors did not prevail over the government agency); see Confederated Tribes of 
Chehalis Reservation v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 260, 271 (Wash. 1998) (holding that a record requestor is 
not entitled to costs and attorney’s fees in an action brought by another party to prevent disclosure of 
public records held by an agency where the agency has agreed to release the records but is prevented 
from doing so by court order). 
 58. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 194–95. 
 59. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.230(3) (2012). 
 60. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.240(1) (2012). 
 61. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 200. 
 62. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.050 (2012). 
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term “privacy” as used in the PRA is intended to have the same defini-
tion that the Washington Supreme Court applied in Hearst Corp. v. 
Hoppe.63 Hearst adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ definition of 
privacy, stating that its provision relating to publicity given to private life 
illustrates the “nature of facts that could be considered matters concern-
ing the private life.”64 Such facts include details that one reveals only to 
close family and friends, like sexual relations, family quarrels, humiliat-
ing illnesses, and details of home life.65 
Even if a court finds that an exemption applies, the PRA states that 
a court may enjoin production of a record only if it finds that production 
“would clearly not be in the public interest and would substantially and 
irreparably damage any person, or would substantially and irreparably 
damage vital governmental functions.”66 The Washington Supreme Court 
has held both that this provision may prevent production even when no 
exemption directly applies67 and that this provision must be satisfied 
even when a separate exemption does apply.68 Therefore, “the trial court 
must find that a specific exemption applies and that disclosure would not 
be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably damage 
a person or a vital government interest.”69 Alternatively, if a privacy right 
identified in the PRA is at stake, the court may order an agency to redact 
identifying information instead of withholding the entire record.70 
                                                            
 63. Act of May 18, 1987, ch. 403, § 1, 1987 Wash. Laws 1546; see Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 580 
P.2d 246, 249 (Wash. 1978). 
 64. Hearst, 580 P.2d at 253 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. b (1977)). 
 65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. b (1977). Specifically, the comment 
states: 
Every individual has some phases of his life and his activities and some facts about him-
self that he does not expose to the public eye, but keeps entirely to himself or at most re-
veals only to his family or to close friends. Sexual relations, for example, are normally 
entirely private matters, as are family quarrels, many unpleasant or disgraceful or humili-
ating illnesses, most intimate personal letters, most details of a man’s life in his home, 
and some of his past history that he would rather forget. When these intimate details of 
his life are spread before the public gaze in a manner highly offensive to the ordinary rea-
sonable man, there is an actionable invasion of his privacy, unless the matter is one of le-
gitimate public interest. 
Id. 
 66. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.540 (2012). 
 67. Dawson v. Daly, 845 P.2d 995, 1004 (Wash. 1993). 
 68. Soter v. Cowles Publ’g Co., 174 P.3d 60, 82 (Wash. 2007). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (2012). 
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B. The Court in Bainbridge Island Police Guild Orders Production with 
Officer Cain’s Name Redacted 
The court in Bainbridge Island Police Guild split 4–4–1.71 The four 
justices in the lead opinion held that the reports must be produced with 
Officer Cain’s name redacted, the four-justice dissent/concurrence advo-
cated for disclosure without redaction, and Justice James Johnson dis-
sented alone in arguing for withholding both reports in their entirety, 
providing the fifth vote for the redaction of Officer Cain’s name.72 Jus-
tice Fairhurst’s lead opinion framed the issue of whether the personal 
information exemption applied as having three parts: (1) whether the re-
ports contained personal information, (2) whether Officer Cain had a 
right to privacy in his identity, and (3) whether the right to privacy would 
be violated if the reports were released.73 
The court quickly concluded that the reports constituted personal 
information, relying entirely on its recent decision in Bellevue John 
Does.74 The court noted that Bellevue John Does defined personal infor-
mation as “information relating to or affecting a particular individual, 
information associated with private concerns, or information that is not 
public or general.”75 Based on this definition, the court in Bellevue John 
Does held that a teacher’s identity in connection with an unsubstantiated 
allegation of sexual misconduct was personal information.76 Thus, the 
court saw no reason to distinguish from Bellevue John Does and held that 
the reports were personal information.77 
The court next considered whether production of the reports impli-
cated Officer Cain’s right to privacy.78 The court stated that the PRA 
does not “explicitly identify when the right to privacy exists.”79 Howev-
er, the court again declined to distinguish Bellevue John Does, where it 
had found that “unsubstantiated allegations are matters concerning the 
teachers’ private lives.”80 The court then addressed the requesters’ heavi-
ly briefed contention that Officer Cain had lost his right to privacy once 
                                                            
 71. Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 259 P.3d 190, 202 (Wash. 2011). 
 72. Id. at 202–08. 
 73. Id. at 196. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (citing Bellevue John Does 1–11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 189 P.3d 139, 145 
(Wash. 2008)). 
 76. Bellevue John Does, 189 P.3d at 145. 
 77. Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 259 P.3d 190, 196 (Wash. 2011). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 197 (citing Bellevue John Does, 189 P.3d at 145). 
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the media publicized his name.81 The court rejected this claim for two 
reasons. First, the court emphasized that the PRA requires an agency to 
look to the contents of the requested document and not the knowledge of 
third parties when deciding if the subject of a report has a right to privacy 
in his or her identity.82 The court stated that even if some members of the 
public may know the identity of the person in the report, an agency vio-
lates the person’s privacy by confirming that knowledge through its pro-
duction.83 Second, the court relied on the practical effect on the agency 
of considering media coverage in determining whether an individual has 
a right to privacy.84 The court cited the City of Puyallup’s request for a 
bright-line rule and noted that if media coverage eliminated the right to 
privacy, then agencies would be placed in the difficult position of mak-
ing a fact-specific inquiry into whether coverage was significant enough 
to eliminate the right.85 Thus, the court held that Officer Cain had a valid 
right to privacy in his identity despite widespread knowledge of his iden-
tity.86 
Having established that a privacy right existed, the court held that 
production of the un-redacted reports would violate that right for three 
reasons.87 First, the court held that allegations of sexual misconduct are 
inherently highly offensive, whether substantiated or unsubstantiated.88 
Again, the court saw no reason to depart from the holding in Bellevue 
John Does, which had reached the same conclusion in the context of 
sexual misconduct accusations against schoolteachers.89 Second, the 
court held that the public has a legitimate interest in how a police de-
partment responds to and investigates allegations, but it does not have an 
interest in the identity of the accused when the allegations are unsubstan-
tiated.90 Finally, the court considered the PRA’s separate requirements 
for granting an injunction to prevent disclosure of a record.91 To enjoin 
production or redact, a court must find that disclosure would clearly not 
be in the public interest and would “substantially and irreparably damage 
any person, or would substantially and irreparably damage vital govern-
                                                            
 81. Id. at 197; see Amended Opening Brief of Appellants, Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. 
City of Puyallup, 259 P.3d 190 (Wash. 2011) (No. 82374–0 & No. 82803–2) [hereinafter Brief of 
Appellants]. 
 82. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 197. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 197–98. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 198. 
 87. Id. at 199. 
 88. Id. at 198. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 199. 
 91. Id. at 200. 
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mental functions.”92 The court held that failing to redact Officer Cain’s 
identity would substantially and irreparably damage him for “the same 
reasons that continued production of . . . Officer Cain’s identity would be 
highly offensive.”93 
C. The Legal Foundations for the Lead Opinion 
The rationale of the lead opinion in Bainbridge Island Police Guild 
primarily relied on five cases. The cases show disagreement and evolu-
tion within the court regarding what constitutes or violates a right to pri-
vacy, leading to the clash in Bainbridge Island Police Guild. 
1. Cowles Publishing Co. v. State Patrol 
In 1988, the Washington Supreme Court considered a case similar 
to Bainbridge Island Police Guild, except that the record requestors 
sought the names of law enforcement officers against whom allegations 
of misconduct had been sustained.94 The court ultimately protected the 
information from disclosure on the basis that its nondisclosure was “es-
sential to effective law enforcement” under the PRA’s law enforcement 
exemption.95 However, the court refused to protect the information under 
the law enforcement exemption’s privacy prong because the instances of 
misconduct while on the job are not private, intimate, personal details of 
the officer’s life, but involve events that occur in the course of public 
service.96 
2. Dawson v. Daly 
The Washington Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Dawson estab-
lished that employee evaluations qualify as personal information that 
bears on the competence of the subject employees.97 Thus, Dawson es-
tablished a presumption that evaluations that do not discuss specific in-
stances of misconduct are presumed to be highly offensive within the 
meaning of the PRA, despite the fact that work evaluations pertain di-
rectly to an employee’s public duty.98 
                                                            
 92. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.540 (2012). 
 93. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 200. 
 94. Cowles Publ’g Co. v. State Patrol, 748 P.2d 597, 598 (Wash. 1988). 
 95. Id. at 606. The law enforcement exemption was then codified as WASH. REV. CODE § 
42.17.310(1)(d), but has since been recodified as WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.240(1) (2012). 
 96. Cowles Publ’g, 748 P.2d at 605. 
 97. Dawson v. Daly, 845 P.2d 995, 1004 (Wash. 1993). 
 98. Id. 
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3. Bellevue John Does 1–11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405 
The primary foundation for the lead opinion in Bainbridge Island 
Police Guild was Bellevue John Does.99 In that case, which preceded 
Bainbridge Island Police Guild by only three years, a five-justice majori-
ty opinion100 held that schoolteachers’ right to privacy is violated by pro-
duction of their names in connection with unsubstantiated allegations of 
sexual misconduct.101 The dispute in Bellevue John Does began in 2002, 
when The Seattle Times requested from the Bellevue, Seattle, and Feder-
al Way school districts copies of all records relating to allegations of 
teacher sexual misconduct in the previous ten years.102 The districts noti-
fied fifty-five schoolteachers that it would release their records, and thir-
ty-seven of the teachers filed suit to enjoin production.103 Perhaps as an 
indication of the lack of clarity in the law, the trial court, court of ap-
peals, and the Washington Supreme Court all came to different conclu-
sions concerning which aspects of the requested records were exempt.104 
The trial court ordered the disclosure of the identities of teachers in cases 
where the investigation was inadequate and when the alleged misconduct 
was substantiated or resulted in discipline.105 The trial court made find-
ings as to the adequacy of each investigation.106 
The court of appeals reversed in part and held that unsubstantiated 
claims are only exempt from disclosure if an adequate investigation 
shows that the allegations are plainly false.107 For example, a student ac-
cused one teacher of a violent rape, kidnapping, and performing satanic 
torture and human sacrifices in a cave.108 A police investigation found no 
physical evidence corroborating any part of the story.109 Thus, the court 
reasoned that the public had no interest in the identity of the teacher be-
cause the allegations against the teacher were patently false.110 On the 
other hand, one teacher accused a fellow teacher of prolonged stroking 
and cuddling of his students.111 The district hired an attorney to investi-
gate, and the investigator found that other teachers did not notice any 
                                                            
 99. Bellevue John Does 1–11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 189 P.3d 139 (Wash. 2008). 
 100. A sixth justice concurred in the result only, leaving a three-justice dissent. Id. at 154. 
 101. Id. at 153. 
 102. Id. at 143. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Bellevue John Does 1–11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 120 P.3d 616, 629 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
 108. Id. at 626. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 627. 
 111. Id. at 625. 
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misconduct, but that the teacher let students sit on his lap before the prin-
cipal cautioned him.112 The district did not discipline the teacher, but the 
court of appeals ordered disclosure of the teacher’s identity because the 
investigation merely found the allegations unsubstantiated; it did not find 
that nothing at all had happened.113 
At the Washington Supreme Court, in a precursor to their sharp dis-
agreement in Bainbridge Island Police Guild, Justice Fairhurst wrote the 
majority opinion in Bellevue John Does while then-Justice Madsen au-
thored the dissent.114 The Court ruled that the identity of the accused 
teacher may be disclosed to the public only if the misconduct was sub-
stantiated or the teacher’s conduct resulted in some form of discipline.115 
The majority’s analysis mirrored the same formula as in Bainbridge Is-
land Police Guild, considering whether the allegations constituted per-
sonal information, whether the teachers had a right to privacy in their 
identities, and whether disclosure of the teachers’ identities would violate 
their right to privacy.116 Again, the majority noted that the PRA117 does 
not define the phrase “personal information.”118 Thus, the Bellevue John 
Does court applied the dictionary definition of personal as “of or relating 
to a particular person: affecting one individual or each of many individu-
als: peculiar or proper to private concerns: not public or general.”119 
Based on this definition, the court said that teachers’ identities are “clear-
ly ‘personal information’ because they relate to particular people.”120 The 
court next considered whether a privacy right existed and stated, as it did 
later in Bainbridge Island Police Guild, that the PRA does not “explicitly 
identify” when the right to privacy exists.121 The court examined the def-
inition of privacy from Hearst,122 the holding in Cowles Publishing that 
                                                            
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 628. 
 114. Bellevue John Does 1–11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 189 P.3d 139 (Wash. 2008). 
 115. Id. at 143. 
 116. Id. at 145. 
 117. The court in Bellevue John Does refers to the PRA by its former name, the Public Disclo-
sure Act (PDA). Id at 142. The legislature amended and recodified the PDA as the PRA in 2005, 
changing the statutory cite from WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17 to WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56. Id. How-
ever, the Seattle Times’ request was placed before the change to the statute, which left the personal 
information and law enforcement exemptions unchanged in relevant part. Id. 
 118. Id. at 145. 
 119. Id. (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1686 (2002)). 
 120. Id. at 145. 
 121. Id. at 146. 
 122. As noted above, Hearst applied the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977)’s defini-
tion of privacy, which offers sexual relations, family quarrels, humiliating illnesses, and details of 
home life as examples of where a privacy right exists. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 580 P.2d 246, 249 
(Wash. 1978). 
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no privacy right protects substantiated allegations of misconduct,123 and 
the rule established in Dawson that the right to privacy applies to routine 
performance evaluations.124 Based on these cases, the court reasoned that 
a privacy right protects unsubstantiated or false accusations of sexual 
misconduct because they are not actions taken by an employee in the 
course of performing public duties.125 
Having established that a privacy right existed, the court concluded 
that un-redacted disclosure would violate the right because it is undisput-
ed that allegations of sexual misconduct are highly offensive, regardless 
of whether or not the allegations are substantiated.126 The court then held 
that unsubstantiated allegations are not a matter of legitimate matter of 
public concern.127 First, the court rejected the distinction between unsub-
stantiated and patently false.128 The court reasoned that the distinction 
was unworkable and would lead to agencies and courts making time con-
suming and directionless inquiries.129 Second, the court concluded that 
the public has no interest in unsubstantiated allegations because “if the 
misconduct didn’t occur, the only actual governmental action is the in-
vestigation.”130 Also, the court cited the Washington Education Associa-
tion’s contention that there is no legitimate public concern in the name of 
the accused unless there is a finding of wrongdoing and that the “alterna-
tive is too damaging to a person’s career . . . without a corresponding 
public benefit.”131 
The court in Bellevue John Does also specifically considered letters 
of direction.132 A letter of direction is a “letter, memorandum or oral di-
rection which does not impose punishment, but seeks to guide or direct 
future performance.”133 The court relied on its holding in Dawson that a 
prosecutor’s performance evaluations were personal information protect-
ed by a right to privacy to conclude the same concerning letters of direc-
tion.134 The court then concluded that release of a letter of direction 
                                                            
 123. See Cowles Publ’g Co. v. State Patrol, 748 P.2d 597, 605 (Wash. 1988). 
 124. See Dawson v. Daly, 845 P.2d 995, 1005 (Wash. 1993). 
 125. Bellevue John Does, 189 P.3d at 147–148. 
 126. Id. at 148. 
 127. Id. at 150. 
 128. Id. at 149. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 150 (citing Amicus Curiae Brief of Am. Civil Liberties Union of Washington at 6, 
Bellevue John Does 1–11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 189 P.3d 139 (Wash. 2008) (No. 78603–
8)). 
 131. Id. at 150 (citing Amicus Curiae Supplemental Brief of Washington Educ. Assoc. at 4, 
Bellevue John Does 1–11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 189 P.3d 139 (Wash. 2008) (No. 78603–
8)). 
 132. Id. at 145. 
 133. Id. at 142 n.3. 
 134. Id. at 145 (citing Dawson v. Daly, 845 P.2d 995 (Wash. 1993)). 
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would be highly offensive to a reasonable person if it did not identify 
substantiated misconduct by the teacher.135 However, the court noted that 
disclosure is not highly offensive if names are redacted.136 Additionally, 
the court concluded that the public has no legitimate interest in the names 
of the teachers who receive letters of direction when the letters do not 
identify substantiated allegations or impose discipline.137 The court ech-
oed its concern in Dawson that releasing the letters of direction may chill 
candor in the evaluation process, resulting in fewer reported allegations 
and an unwillingness by supervisors to memorialize communications in 
writing.138 
Justice Madsen began her dissent by affirming, as she later did in 
Bainbridge Island Police Guild, that the legislature has explicitly adopt-
ed the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ definition of the “right to privacy,” 
as followed by the court in Hearst.139 While the majority emphasized that 
there is no real government action other than an investigation when an 
allegation is unsubstantiated or false, the dissent emphasized that the al-
legations do not pertain to private life, but to public duties.140 The dissent 
claimed that precedent supports disclosing the identities of public em-
ployees when the information concerns specific instances of misconduct 
occurring in the course of performance of public duties, whether or not 
the allegations are substantiated.141 Importantly, the dissent noted that 
unsubstantiated does not mean untrue.142 The dissent argued that placing 
the power in the hands of school districts to decide what is or what is not 
substantiated “would be the most direct course to [the PRA’s] 
devitalization.”143 As support, the dissent noted a parade of examples of 
educator, school, and school district misconduct, including an incident 
where a Seattle educator accused of sex and drug dealing with students 
was promised $69,000 and silence in exchange for his resignation.144 Be-
cause a pattern of such allegations can show the potential of abuse, the 
dissent claimed that the public will lack the information necessary to en-
                                                            
 135. Id. at 151–52. 
 136. Id. at 152. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 152–53 (citing Dawson, 845 P.2d at 1005). 
 139. Id. at 154 (Madsen, J., dissenting) (citing Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 580 P.2d 246 (Wash. 
1978)). 
 140. Id. at 154–55 (Madsen, J., dissenting). 
 141. Id. at 156–57 (Madsen, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id. at 154 (Madsen, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 159 (Madsen, J., dissenting) (citing Hearst, 580 P.2d at 251). 
 144. Id. at 158–59 (Madsen, J., dissenting) (citing POLICY & PROGRAM STUDIES SERV., U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC., EDUCATOR SEXUAL MISCONDUCT: A SYNTHESIS OF EXISTING LITERATURE 
(2004)). 
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sure that a specific teacher does not continue to have access to children if 
identities are redacted, even if the rest of a report is disclosed.145 
4. City of Tacoma v. Tacoma News, Inc. 
The basis for the distinction between substantiated and unsubstanti-
ated allegations lies largely in the court of appeals’ 1992 decision in City 
of Tacoma v. Tacoma News, Inc.146 In that case, the court denied access 
to police investigations regarding unsubstantiated allegations of child 
abuse against a mayoral candidate.147 The court reasoned that a finding 
that allegations are “unsubstantiated” after reasonable efforts to investi-
gate is “indicative though not always dispositive of falsity.”148 The court 
noted that the Restatement definition of privacy adopted in Hearst allows 
consideration of truth or falsity as a factor in determining whether the 
public has a legitimate interest in the information.149 Thus, the court of 
appeals concluded that the public has no legitimate interest in the police 
department’s investigation of unsubstantiated claims of child abuse 
against a mayoral candidate.150 
5. Koenig v. City of Des Moines 
In 2006, the court’s holding in Koenig v. City of Des Moines set the 
stage for its willingness in Bainbridge Island Police Guild to produce 
redacted information, even when it is clear that the requestor of the rec-
ords knows the identity of the individual whose name was redacted.151 In 
Koenig,152 the father of a child victim of sexual assault requested from 
the city and police department all records concerning the assault and sub-
sequent investigation.153 In accordance with an exemption specifically 
designed to protect victims of sexual assault, the five justices in the ma-
jority required that the city produce the reports with the name of the vic-
tim redacted.154 However, Justice Fairhurst authored a vigorous dissent, 
claiming that the information must be entirely withheld because the vic-
                                                            
 145. Id. at 159 (Madsen, J., dissenting). 
 146. See Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 259 P.3d 190, 207 (Wash. 2011) 
(favorably citing Bellevue John Doe’s reliance on City of Tacoma v. Tacoma News, Inc., 827 P.2d 
1094 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)). 
 147. Tacoma News, 827 P.2d at 1095–96. 
 148. Id. at 1099. 
 149. Id. (citing Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 580 P.2d 246, 249 (Wash. 1978)). 
 150. Id. at 1095. 
 151. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 198–99 (citing Koenig v. City of Des 
Moines, 142 P.3d 162, 163 (Wash. 2006)). 
 152. The plaintiff Koenig in Koenig v. City of Des Moines has no relation to Kim Koenig of 
Bainbridge Island Police Guild. 
 153. Koenig, 142 P.3d at 163. 
 154. Id. 
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tim’s father had asked for the information by the name of the victim.155 
Hence, any production would affirm to the requestor that the child was a 
victim of sexual assault, even if the name was redacted, resulting in 
“fishing expedition[s].”156 Later, however, Justice Fairhurst favorably 
cited the Koenig majority opinion while ordering that the investigative 
reports in Bainbridge Island Police Guild be produced in redacted form, 
despite the knowledge of the requestors and the public.157 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S LOGIC FAILS TO FIT THE INTENT OR 
LANGUAGE OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 
The Washington Supreme Court’s lead opinion in Bainbridge Is-
land Police Guild wrongly applied the definition of the right to privacy. 
The primary disagreement between the opinions in Bainbridge Island 
Police Guild is the lead opinion’s view that unsubstantiated misconduct 
is not conduct that occurred in the course of public duties, as opposed to 
the dissent/concurrence’s view that unsubstantiated misconduct is not an 
aspect of personal, private life.158 The dissent/concurrence’s characteriza-
tion of the right to privacy is more true to the language and intent of the 
PRA. 
First, Chief Justice Madsen’s dissent most accurately interpreted 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ definition of privacy—which the 
court adopted in Hearst and which the legislature affirmed.159 In Hearst, 
the court specifically cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D 
comment b as an example of situations where the right to privacy ex-
ists.160 The provision cites details such as sexual relations, family quar-
rels, humiliating illnesses, and the details of home life as examples of 
when the right to privacy exists.161 The Restatement comment’s list is 
comprised of things that deal specifically with intimate, personal details 
of one’s life, not simply things that did not occur during the course of 
one’s role as a public figure.162 Thus, the dissent/concurrence’s emphasis 
on the fact that Officer Cain’s alleged misconduct was not part of his 
personal life is more true to the privacy definition adopted in Hearst than 
                                                            
 155. Id. at 169–70 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. at 166 (majority opinion). 
 157. Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 259 P.3d 190, 198–99 (Wash. 2011) 
(citing Koenig, 142 P.3d at 164). 
 158. See id. at 204 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
 159. See id.; see also Act of May 18, 1987, ch. 403, § 1, 1987 Wash. Laws 1546; Hearst Corp. 
v. Hoppe, 580 P.2d 246, 249 (Wash. 1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
 160. Hearst, 580 P.2d at 253. 
 161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. b (1977). 
 162. See id. 
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the lead opinion’s insistence that the unsubstantiated allegations did not 
pertain to Officer Cain’s public duties.163 
In adopting this view, the lead opinion in Bainbridge Island Police 
Guild and the majority in Bellevue John Does also ignored the distinction 
between embarrassment and privacy.164 As the record requestors noted in 
their brief, exemptions may not be founded on vague notions of privacy 
or embarrassment, but must be grounded in clearly delineated statutory 
language.165 The PRA expressly commands that courts consider the poli-
cy of open examination of government records when reviewing an agen-
cy action, “even though such examination may cause inconvenience or 
embarrassment to public officials or others.”166 Thus, because embar-
rassment is not a valid concern under the PRA, embarrassment cannot 
mean the same thing as privacy. However, neither the lead opinion in 
Bainbridge Island Police Guild nor the majority in Bellevue John Does 
mentioned the word embarrassment even once.167 Instead, Chief Justice 
Madsen rightfully noted that the court expansively construed the privacy 
exemptions at issue “by weighing the strength of possible embarrassment 
and adverse reaction and ignoring the real meaning of privacy inter-
est.”168 
Additionally, both the lead opinion in Bainbridge Island Police 
Guild and the majority in Bellevue John Does rely on a faulty premise. 
Specifically, both opinions state that the PRA does not “explicitly identi-
fy” when the right to privacy in question exists.169 Ironically, in Bellevue 
John Does, the court immediately followed this statement by citing to the 
definition adopted in Hearst.170 However, in Bainbridge Island Police 
Guild, the court follows the same statement by immediately referring to 
the definition of privacy adopted in Bellevue John Does.171 The court’s 
reliance on Bellevue John Does thus leads to a misapplication of the law 
because despite referencing the correct definition of a privacy right, the 
court in Bellevue John Does ignored that definition in its analysis.172 As a 
result, the court’s insistence that the legislature has not explicitly identi-
                                                            
 163. See Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 259 P.3d 190, 203–04 (Madsen, 
C.J., dissenting). 
 164. Id. at 205 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
 165. Brief of Appellant at 8, Bainbridge Island, 259 P.3d 190 (Wash. 2011) (No. 82374–0 & 
No. 82803–2) (citing Hearst, 580 P.2d at 248). 
 166. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.550(3) (2012). 
 167. See Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 192–202; Bellevue John Does 1–11 v. 
Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 189 P.3d 139, 142–153 (Wash. 2008). 
 168. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 205 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
 169. Id. at 196–197; Bellevue John Does, 189 P.3d at 146. 
 170. Bellevue John Does, 189 P.3d at 146. 
 171. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 196–97. 
 172. Id. at 205 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
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fied when a right to privacy exists, despite the legislature’s explicit adop-
tion of the definition of the right to privacy in Hearst, simply becomes an 
excuse to expand the parameters of the right to privacy.173 
Further, the court based its decisions in both Bainbridge Island Po-
lice Guild and Bellevue John Does on suspect precedent.174 For instance, 
the court in Bellevue John Does relied on Tacoma News for the proposi-
tion that false accusations of misconduct are highly offensive and pertain 
to no legitimate public interest.175 However, the child abuse alleged in 
Tacoma News was not alleged to have occurred during the course of the 
mayoral candidate’s public duties and pertained specifically to the ac-
cused’s private life.176 Thus, in Tacoma News, the court had no trouble 
deciding that a privacy right existed and moved to the question of wheth-
er the right was violated.177 But in Bellevue John Does and Bainbridge 
Island Police Guild, the court should have never reached the question of 
whether the privacy right was violated because unlike in Tacoma News, 
the allegations did not pertain to any aspect of the private life of the ac-
cused, but to a police officer’s public duties.178 
However, not all of the blame for the misapplication of the Hearst 
privacy definition falls on Bainbridge Island Police Guild and Bellevue 
John Does. Two earlier cases—Dawson and Cowles Publishing—show 
muddled analysis that overlooks when a privacy right exists. The court 
primarily veered off course fifteen years before Bellevue John Does in 
Dawson. Again the court cited the proper definition of a right to priva-
cy—the “intimate details of one’s personal and private life”—but failed 
to correctly apply it.179 At issue were several documents from a county 
prosecutor’s personnel file, including performance evaluations.180 In con-
sidering the performance evaluations, the court jumped to the analysis of 
whether the privacy right was violated without first considering whether 
the performance evaluations constituted personal information or whether 
a privacy right even existed.181 While purporting to analyze the offen-
siveness prong of whether a privacy right was violated, the court cited a 
federal court’s statement that an individual’s work performance is per-
                                                            
 173. See id. at 204 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
 174. See supra Part III.C. 
 175. Bellevue John Does, 189 P.3d at 148–49. 
 176. City of Tacoma v. Tacoma News, Inc., 827 P.2d 1095 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
 177. Id. at 1097. 
 178. See Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 196–97; Bellevue John Does, 189 P.3d at 
146; Tacoma News, 827 P.2d at 1095. 
 179. Dawson v. Daly, 845 P.2d 995, 1003–04 (Wash. 1993). 
 180. Id. at 998–99. 
 181. Id. at 1003. 
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sonal information under the FOIA.182 But the FOIA’s broad privacy ex-
emption does not expressly rely on the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ 
definition of privacy and cannot provide dispositive guidance.183 And, 
more importantly, this statement by the court shows that it was blending 
the analysis of whether the information is personal with whether the re-
lease of the information would be highly offensive. The result is that the 
court ignored the Hearst court’s limitation of the right to privacy to inti-
mate details of personal life.184 The court properly noted that embarrass-
ment was not grounds for exempting the performance evaluations, but 
held without explanation that “employee evaluations contain personal 
information” because the sensitivity of information relating to one’s 
competence “goes beyond mere embarrassment,” and is therefore highly 
offensive.185 But the court never should have reached the question of 
whether disclosure of performance evaluations would be highly offensive 
because the information at issue was not personal, as required by the 
PRA.186 An evaluation of one’s competence in relation to performance of 
government work has nothing to do with personal life, but everything to 
do with a public employee’s public duties. 
The court further blended the issues in Cowles Publishing.187 There, 
the court properly noted that instances of misconduct during a police of-
ficer’s work do not fall under the definition of “personal privacy,” but 
the court relied on the fact that the information was not of a personal na-
ture to claim that disclosure would not be highly offensive.188 However, 
like in Dawson, the court should have never reached the question of 
whether disclosure would be highly offensive.189 Further, it is inaccurate 
to claim that disclosure of instances of misconduct during work perfor-
mance would not be highly offensive to a reasonable person. In fact, as 
previously mentioned, the court held in Bainbridge Island Police Guild 
that even substantiated allegations of sexual misconduct in the workplace 
are highly offensive.190 Instead, whether misconduct pertained to a public 
employee’s work speaks to the requirement that the public have a legiti-
mate interest, not to whether release of the information would be highly 
                                                            
 182. Id. (citing Celmins v. United States Dep’t of Treasury, 457 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 
1977)). 
 183. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2012). The FOIA also has only nine exemptions, leaving much 
to judicial interpretation as opposed to specific legislative determinations. See id. 
 184. See Dawson, 845 P.2d at 1003. 
 185. Id. at 1004 (citing Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 318 (1979)). 
 186. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.230(3) (2012); see Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of 
Puyallup, 259 P.3d 190, 204 (2011) (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
 187. See Cowles Publ’g Co. v. State Patrol, 748 P.2d 597, 605 (Wash. 1988). 
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 189. See Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 204 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
 190. Id. at 198 (lead opinion). 
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offensive. Thus, in Cowles Publishing, the court failed to separate the 
issues and left blurred exactly which issues it had decided.191 
A. The Effect of Expanding the Right to Privacy 
The immediate effect of redacting Officer Cain’s name in Bain-
bridge Island Police Guild was not substantial. The requestors and the 
public were already aware of Officer Cain’s identity in connection with 
the allegations.192 While the court’s sweeping rule that the public never 
has an interest in the name of the subjects of unsubstantiated allegations 
of misconduct193 cannot always be correct,194 the public’s primary inter-
est is in how the agency responds to allegations of misconduct.195 The 
production of the redacted reports in Bainbridge Island Police Guild 
served this interest,196 which led access-to-government advocates to re-
gard the case as a practical victory.197 But the effects of the court’s ina-
bility to agree and its expansion of the right to privacy will be lasting. 
One effect of the court’s misapplication of the definition of the 
right to privacy is that agencies can manipulate PRA exemptions relating 
to privacy.198 The court has stated that granting the power of interpreting 
the PRA to the very agencies that the PRA is meant to supervise “would 
be the most direct course to its devitalization.”199 Justice Madsen makes 
this point clear in her dissent in Bellevue John Does.200 There, then-
Justice Madsen noted that schools have been known to promise secrecy 
                                                            
 191. See Cowles Publ’g, 748 P.2d at 605. 
 192. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 259 P.3d at 193. 
 193. See Bellevue John Does 1–11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 189 P.3d 139, 150 (Wash. 
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in exchange for resignations, allowing unnamed predatory teachers to 
move from school to school.201 This example illustrates both the signifi-
cance of redacting the name of the teachers and the reason why courts 
cannot trust agencies to interpret the PRA.202 
Moreover, the courts’ rulings vest too much trust in government 
agencies by deferring to the agencies’ determination of what is or is not 
substantiated. Admittedly, the investigative reports in Bainbridge Island 
Police Guild did not suffer from this problem because the Bainbridge 
Island Police Department asked the Mercer Island Police Department to 
conduct an internal investigation and the Puyallup Police Department to 
conduct a criminal investigation.203 One could make the case that the re-
lationship between police departments renders even these investigations 
suspect; or, one might note that the Bainbridge Island Police Department 
itself ultimately applied the label of “unsubstantiated” to the reports.204 
However, outsourcing the investigations greatly increased their credibil-
ity and reduced concerns that the finding of unsubstantiated was un-
founded. But that was not the case in Bellevue John Does, where the 
schools often conducted their own investigations.205 Further, the Bain-
bridge Island police chief had the option of keeping the investigation in 
house, which would have raised deeper concerns.206 Thus, Bainbridge 
Island Police Guild set a potentially dangerous precedent of deferring to 
agencies and created an incentive for agencies to deem an allegation un-
substantiated. 
Another effect of expanding the right to privacy to include details 
that are not personal and intimate is that the court may use the privacy 
components of the personal information and law enforcement exemp-
tions as a fall back to prevent disclosure of highly embarrassing infor-
mation that pertains to a public employee’s work. The PRA is clear that 
courts must construe exemptions narrowly with the policy of open gov-
ernment in mind.207 Moreover, the legislature has expressly stated that it 
intended privacy as used in the PRA to refer to the type of personal and 
intimate details laid out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.208 Thus, the 
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insistence of the courts in Bainbridge Island Police Guild and Bellevue 
John Does that the legislature has not explicitly identified when a right to 
privacy exists is disturbing because it represents a sharp departure from 
the court’s supposed commitment to interpret PRA exemptions narrow-
ly.209 
This willingness to depart from the plain language of the PRA is al-
so evident in the court’s quest to create a bright-line rule. The PRA 
makes clear that courts must interpret the PRA according to the policy of 
open government “even though such examination may cause inconven-
ience or embarrassment to public officials or others.”210 Thus, as desira-
ble and beneficial as a bright-line rule may be, it is not the court’s place 
to prioritize the convenience of a bright-line rule over the PRA’s policy 
of disclosure.211 
It may very well be sound policy to redact the names of public em-
ployees who are the subjects of unsubstantiated allegations of miscon-
duct and to prevent disclosure of routine performance evaluations.212 
However, because the right to privacy refers only to personal and inti-
mate details that do not pertain to one’s public employment, the personal 
information and law enforcement exemptions are twisted and expanded 
when used by courts to accomplish such means. 
B. How the Court Should Analyze the Personal Information and Law 
Enforcement Exemptions 
The court’s right-to-privacy jurisprudence reflects the difficulty in 
weighing the competing interests at stake. As the law stands, public offi-
cials have too much discretion but still face uncertainty, citizens do not 
know what they have the right to know, and lower courts must follow 
incoherent guidance. The court should step back and reframe its right-to-
privacy analysis. 
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1. The Right to Privacy 
Washington courts should apply the right to privacy in the PRA on-
ly to personal and intimate details that have nothing to do with one’s 
public job performance and let the legislature fill in the gaps. Thus, the 
court should abandon the proposition that the PRA does not “explicitly 
identify”213 when the right to privacy exists and, instead, narrowly con-
strue the definition of privacy applied in Hearst,214 as required by the 
PRA.215 
An appropriate first step toward this more accurate application of 
the law would be for the court to collapse its analysis of whether infor-
mation is personal and whether a privacy right exists. The personal in-
formation exemption states that personal information is exempt “to the 
extent that it would violate a right to privacy.”216 This statutory construc-
tion implies that agencies may disclose some personal information with-
out violating one’s right to privacy. However, the right to privacy refer-
enced in the law enforcement exemption contains no personal infor-
mation prong, but courts still consider the exemption to protect the same 
right.217 Additionally, the Hearst definition of privacy adopted by the 
legislature protects only information that is personal.218 Thus, some per-
sonal information may not be protected by the right to privacy, but the 
right to privacy incorporates only personal information. As a result, sepa-
rating the analysis of whether information is personal and whether in-
formation fits the Hearst definition of the right to privacy is superfluous. 
The court should begin by applying the Hearst definition of privacy, 
which requires that the information be personal. 
2. The Unsubstantiated Versus Substantiated Distinction 
Even if the court continues its broad interpretation of the right to 
privacy, the court should abandon its categorical distinction between un-
substantiated and substantiated allegations. Instead, the court should con-
sider whether the allegations were false or unsubstantiated as merely one 
factor along with others, such as the quality of the investigation. The 
court of appeals in Bellevue John Does drew a distinction between un-
substantiated allegations and those that are patently false.219 The court’s 
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reasoning was that the public may have an interest in unsubstantiated 
claims because they relate to at least some on-the-job conduct of a public 
employee, while the subjects of patently false allegations are of no inter-
est to the public.220 As a consideration of the public’s interest, this ap-
proach is more logically sound than the distinction between unsubstanti-
ated and substantiated because government conduct may be significant 
even if an allegation is unsubstantiated.221 
For example, in Bainbridge Island Police Guild, Officer Cain ad-
mitted to forcefully arresting Ms. Koenig and hip checking her against a 
police vehicle.222 Even though independent investigations did not find 
sufficient evidence of the alleged sexual misconduct, the arrest consti-
tutes conduct with which the public has a legitimate concern.223 While 
scenarios like this make the rule adopted by the court of appeals in Belle-
vue John Does tempting, the Washington Supreme Court correctly point-
ed out that such a distinction is impractical because the line between un-
substantiated and patently false is blurry.224 However, the distinction be-
tween substantiated and unsubstantiated may be just as blurry. What if 
the investigations in Bainbridge Island Police Guild had determined that 
Officer Cain committed punishable misconduct during the course of the 
arrest, but not the sexual conduct and strangulation alleged by Ms. 
Koenig? Or what if the investigation concluded that Officer Cain had 
strangled, but not “dry humped,” Ms. Koenig? In such a case, Ms. 
Koenig’s specific allegations would be unsubstantiated, but Officer Cain 
would have committed misconduct, creating a valid public interest in his 
identity. 
Both distinctions are impractical, and both are unnecessary if the 
court properly applies the definition of right to privacy, which would 
prevent any allegation regarding a public employee’s duties from being 
considered private. But if the court continues its misapplication of the 
definition of a right to privacy, the court should avoid the impractical 
categorical rule against disclosure of unsubstantiated allegations and, 
instead, follow the more reasonable rule of the court of appeals in Taco-
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ma News.225 Tacoma News held that a finding of unsubstantiated or false 
is merely a factor in determining the public’s interest.226 This approach 
comports with the intent of the PRA to promote openness despite incon-
venience.227 Further, weighing factors such as whether the allegation was 
substantiated and the quality of the investigation will minimize the per-
verse incentive for agencies to find an allegation unsubstantiated and 
grant public access in cases where other factors establish a legitimate 
public interest.228 
3. The Injunction Requirements 
Finally, the court should follow its precedent by treating the injunc-
tion provision of the PRA as a separate ground for refusing to withhold 
information. The Washington Supreme Court has held that “the trial 
court must find that a specific exemption applies and that disclosure 
would not be in the public interest and would substantially and irrepara-
bly damage a person or a vital government interest.”229 In Bainbridge 
Island Police Guild, the court held that production of the reports with 
Officer Cain’s identity un-redacted would substantially and irreparably 
damage him “[f]or the same reasons that continued production of the 
portions of the PCIR and MIIIR containing Officer Cain’s identity would 
be highly offensive.”230 The court’s reason for holding that producing the 
un-redacted reports would be highly offensive was that Bellevue John 
Does had already established that any allegation of sexual misconduct is 
highly offensive.231 Backtracking even further, the court’s reasoning in 
Bellevue John Does was that it is “undisputed” that disclosure of the 
identities of the teachers would be highly offensive.232 Thus, the court’s 
reasons for why the production of Officer Cain’s name would be both 
highly offensive and irreparably damaging are elusive. 
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While the general proposition that allegations of sexual misconduct 
are highly offensive to a reasonable person is indeed difficult to dispute, 
this assertion provides no support for the separate consideration that pro-
duction of Officer Cain’s identity would substantially and irreparably 
damage him. One reporter briefly obtained an un-redacted copy of the 
PCIR, and news stories had already linked Officer Cain to the allega-
tions.233 Additionally, after the Washington Supreme Court’s ruling, the 
media published many more articles linking Officer Cain to the allega-
tions.234 Officer Cain’s public exposure would not have been intensified 
if the reports were produced un-redacted. Any damage to Officer Cain’s 
reputation had either already occurred or was bound to occur after 
providing redacted reports to requestors who already knew Officer Cain 
was the subject of the reports.235 Thus, the plurality stuck to its commit-
ment to create a bright-line rule against the production of unsubstantiated 
claims, even though its rule was inapplicable to the facts at hand. The 
troubling result is that the court ignored its precedent and blended the 
requirements of the privacy right exemptions and the PRA’s injunction 
requirements, rendering the injunction requirements meaningless.236 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the court’s logic in Bainbridge Island Police Guild is sus-
pect, the ruling preserves the ability of the public to supervise how the 
government reacts to claims of misconduct by public officers. Addition-
ally, the ruling had no disparate impact on the right of the public or the 
accuser to find out why the allegations were deemed unsubstantiated. 
However, the court should reform its jurisprudence interpreting the right 
to privacy back to the approach adopted in Hearst and affirmed by the 
legislature. There are many instances where the disclosure of unsubstan-
tiated allegations against police officers or routine performance evalua-
tions may do more public harm than good, as well as cause the subjects 
of such records extreme embarrassment. But the Washington Supreme 
Court’s use of the right to privacy in the personal information and law 
enforcement exemptions of the PRA as a vessel for protecting these in-
terests has expanded the exemptions. Unchecked expansion of the PRA’s 
exemptions not only contradicts the word and spirit of the PRA, but also 
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threatens the right of Washington’s citizens to supervise their govern-
ment. 
 
